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I.

INTRODUCTION

News headlines for nearly three years have focused on how busy, full,
and overcrowded hospitals have been during the global COVID-19 pandemic.1
It seems almost unimaginable that at a time when health care services have
proved critical that certain rural communities are experiencing the shuttering of
hospital doors. This was the stark reality when Jellico Medical Center shut down
in March 2021 in Jellico, Tennessee, a small town on the border of Kentucky in
the heart of Appalachia.2 At the time of its closing, the 54-bed hospital had not
admitted a patient since the previous November, providing only emergency
outpatient services.3 The lack of admissions, however, was not indicative of a

*

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; Associate Professor of Law & Director of Health
Law Studies, Belmont University College of Law. Deborah would like to thank her research
assistant Delaney Durst for her tremendous work in getting this article to publication and also to
the West Virginia Law Review for its invitation to speak at this wonderful symposium and all of
the editorial staff for their immense helping with this article.
1
See, e.g., Josh Nathan-Kazis, Many Hospitals Are Getting Overwhelmed. It’s a Crisis That
Could Affect Healthcare for Years to Come, BARRON’S (Jan. 14, 2022, 5:35 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/covid-cases-hospitals-overwhelmed-crisis-51642170882.
2

Taylor Sisk, Rural Tennessee Is Losing More Hospitals Than Anywhere in the Country, but
COVID-19 Isn’t Fully to Blame, THE DAILY YONDER (July 27, 2021),
https://dailyyonder.com/rural-tennessee-is-losing-more-hospitals-than-anywhere-in-the-countrybut-covid-19-isnt-fully-to-blame/2021/07/27/.
3

Id.
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lack of need for services.4 The hospital was located in Campbell County, which
“ranks 93rd worst in health outcomes of Tennessee’s 95 counties and has a
poverty rate approximately double that of the nation.”5 The former operator,
Rennova Health, Inc.,6 had disclosed in certain company filings after closure of
the hospital that it owed 49 million dollars and had spent twice as much as it was
able to collect from operations of the small hospital.7 Rennova Health claimed
that the building owned by the city had significant deficiencies requiring a large
capital investment in order to continue services—an investment that it was
calling on the city to make.8 Despite the Jellico city council’s announcement that
another company, Boa Vida Healthcare, was under contract and would be
reopening the hospital soon, the doors of the building remain closed for now.9
Individuals must seek care in neighboring towns and ambulance service is only
available from out-of-county providers exacerbating wait and transport times.10
The void of hospital services is not unique to Campbell County
and the experiences of Jellico, Tennessee reflect similar
situations across the country but primarily in the south.11

4

Id.
Id.; see also County Rankings and Roadmaps, UNIV. OF WIS. POPULATION HEALTH INST., 6
(2021),
https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/sites/default/files/media/document/CHR2021_TN.pdf.
5

6
Overview, RENNOVA HEALTH, https://www.rennovahealth.com/about/overview (last visited
Mar. 7, 2022).
7
Cole Sullivan, Jellico Hospital Closed, Operator Leaves Facility Days After City Votes to
Cut
Ties,
WBIR
10NEWS
(Mar.
3,
2021,
7:16
PM),
https://www.wbir.com/article/news/health/jellico-hospital-closed-operator-leaves-facility-daysafter-city-votes-to-cut-ties/51-fcbe1327-9fef-4c23-b0ad-51d25a181a91 (explaining that the city of
Jellico is the owner of the building and had entered into a contract with Rennova Health to operate
the hospital, which is cancelled based on alleged breach of the contract by Rennova Health to
provide contracted services).
8
Blake Stevens, City Leaders Vote to Terminate Contract with Jellico Medical Center, ABC
WATE (Mar. 3, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://www.wate.com/news/local-news/city-leaders-vote-toterminate-contract-with-jellico-medical-center/.
9
See Sisk, supra note 2; JELLICO MEDICAL CENTER, https://www.jellicomc.com/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2022) (“Jellico Medical Center is currently closed and not accepting patients. Apologies
for any inconvenience caused. For information regarding access to medical records, please visit
our Contact Page.”).
10

See Sisk, supra note 2.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-93, RURAL HOSPITAL CLOSURES:
AFFECTED RESIDENTS HAD REDUCED ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES 8 (2020),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-93.pdf [hereinafter “Rural Hospital Report 2020”]. When
Jellico Medical Center shut down, the next closest hospital in the state is in LaFollette, which is
approximately 25 miles from Jellico. According to a 2020 GAO Report, “residents living in the
closed hospitals’ service areas would have to travel substantially farther to access certain health
care services. Specifically, . . . the median distance to access of the more common health care
services increased by about 20 miles from 2012 to 2018. For example, the median distance to
access general inpatient services was 3.4 miles in 2012, compared to 23.9 miles in 2018.” Id. at 2.
11
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Twenty-one of Tennessee’s ninety-five counties do not have a
hospital, making Tennessee the state with the highest rural
hospital closure per capita than any other state.12 While the
situation is particularly dire in Tennessee, for almost a decade,
the financial stability of hospitals in rural communities has been
in peril across the United States.13 With rising health care costs
and declining rural populations, health care administrators,
policy analysts, and state and federal legislators have been
struggling to identify the right combination of tools and
resources that might stave off hospital closures and decreased
access to care in rural communities. The global coronavirus
pandemic has further accelerated the crises already existing in
many rural hospitals and has caused an entirely new set of
obstacles for rural communities in trying to ensure access to
needed services.14 Rural hospital fragility poses issues beyond
health access. It is well documented that the loss of a hospital
and health services in a community impacts the economic
viability and sustainability of the community-at-large.15
According to the American Hospital Association (“AHA”),
hospitals support $2.30 of business activity for every dollar that
a hospital spends.16 Furthermore, because a hospital might be
one of the largest employers in a rural community, the influence
of a hospital is felt to an even greater extent.17 Carolyn Bruce,
then-CEO of Western Healthcare Alliance in Grand Junction,
Colorado, stressed the importance of hospitals to the community
in 2018, stating: Decreasing services or closing a hospital stunts
12

See Sisk, supra note 2.

See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-34, RURAL HOSPITAL CLOSURES:
NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF AFFECTED HOSPITALS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 2 (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-634.pdf [hereinafter, “Rural Hospital Report 2018”].
14
See Jessie Hellmann, Rural Reckoning: COVID-19 Highlights Long-Standing Challenges
Facing Rural Hospitals. Will It Create Momentum for Change?, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 19,
2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/providers/rural-reckoning-covid-19highlights-long-standing-challenges-facing-rural-hospitals-will (citing various challenges either
arising or lingering with rural hospitals including nursing shortages, recruitment issues, uninsured
and uncompensated care, vaccine hesitancy, COVID-19 burnout, etc.).
15
See George M. Holmes, Rebecca T. Slifkin, Randy K. Randolph & Stephanie Poley,
Underserved Populations: The Effect of Rural Hospital Closures on Community Economic Health,
41(2)
HEALTH
SERVS.
RSCH.
467,
467
(Apr.
2006),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1702512/pdf/hesr041-0467.pdf; Mark Holmes,
Rural Hospital Closure and Effect on Local Economies, RURAL HEALTH RSCH. GATEWAY,
https://www.ruralhealthresearch.org/projects/100002523 (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
16
Rural Hospitals: The Beating Heart of a Local Economy, NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N
(June 18, 2018), https://www.ruralhealth.us/blogs/ruralhealthvoices/july-2018/rural-hospitals-thebeating-heart-of-a-local-econ (analyzing the American Hospital Association’s January 2017 report
on the economic contributions of hospitals).
17
Id.
13
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growth. Companies are rarely attracted to relocate to a
community with little or no health care. Existing businesses may
be forced to close or move out of the community. The rest of the
community, health-wise and economically, can enter a
downward spiral of decline.”18 Thus, hospital closures create
more than a health crisis—the closures can devastate the
community at-large.
Although financial stability in rural hospitals has been a relatively longstanding national problem,19 in the last decade, hospital closures and the
incidence of highly distressed hospitals in rural areas have disproportionately
impacted certain states.20 States that have not expanded their Medicaid programs
under the Affordable Care Act,21 which implemented a program to extend
additional federal support to cover adults living below 138% of the federal
poverty line (referred to herein as “Medicaid Expansion”), are bearing the brunt
of this crisis.22 Since 2010, Tennessee has seen the most hospital closures per
capita with 16 closures, including Jellico Medical Center, and Texas leads the
country in the number of hospital closures with 21 closures since 2010.23 Neither
state has expanded its Medicaid program and has no pending referendums to do
so.24 In fact, only 12 states have yet to adopt Medicaid Expansion,25 and eight of
those twelve states lead the country in hospital closures.26 Although the reason
for hospital closures is multi-faceted and complex, health policy experts have
consistently identified the lack of Medicaid Expansion as a key driver for

18

Id.

19

See Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 5.
See Taylor Sisk, As Appalachian Hospitals Disappear, Rural Americans Grapple with
Limited
Care,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(July
14,
2021),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/appalachian-hospitals-are-disappearing.
20

21

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
22

See Richard C. Lindrooth, Marcelo C. Perraillon, Rose Y. Hardy & Gregory J. Tung,
Understanding The Relationship Between Medicaid Expansions And Hospital Closures, 37
HEALTH AFFS. no. 1, 111, 116 (2018); Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 26 (“A 2018
study found that Medicaid expansion was associated with improved hospital financial performance
and substantially lower likelihood of closure, especially in rural markets and counties with large
numbers of uninsured adults before Medicaid expansion.”).
23
Rural Hospital Closures, THE CECIL G. SHEPS CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RSCH., UNIV. OF
N.C.,
https://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/programs-projects/rural-health/rural-hospital-closures/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2022).
24
See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansiondecisions-interactive-map/ [hereinafter “Medicaid Expansion Status”].
25
26

Id.
Sisk, supra note 2.
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hospital closures and consider future adoption of expansion as an imperative.27
To that end, there have been several initiatives within the last year to promote
and incentivize the remaining twelve states that have not expanded their
Medicaid programs to do so.28 Thus far, no states have opted for expansion based
on these incentives—although Medicaid Expansion remains an option.29 Several
other bills have been proposed in Congress to close the so-called “coverage
gap,”30 which range from a federal public option for those in the gap to additional
state incentives.31 What, if any, of these are the right approach, and what might
be the impact of each of these initiatives on helping to slow the health care access
crisis that is ongoing in rural communities? Are there other factors in these
particular states and rural communities that make them exceptionally vulnerable
regardless of Medicaid Expansion? Are expectations for the benefits of Medicaid
Expansion so high that the hopes for what will be possible for rural hospitals and
communities will be unable to be realized? This Article will argue that current
federal initiatives attempting to incentivize states to expand Medicaid, while
well-intentioned, are politically challenging and unlikely to be successful with
the present state leadership. Regardless, the adoption of Medicaid Expansion will
remain a key component to maintaining stability in rural health markets and
continued federal efforts to narrow the coverage gap should continue.
This Article will explore both current and proposed legal approaches
aimed at closing the Medicaid coverage gap to determine whether such efforts

27

Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 241, 250–51 (2018); See also Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 27.
28
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 247 (2021).
29
It should be noted that at the time that the American Rescue Plan Act was enacted, Missouri
and Oklahoma had approved Medicaid Expansion via a ballot initiative, but it had not yet been
implemented in either state. Both states were eligible for the incentive payments if they
implemented expansion as of July 1, 2021. Oklahoma implemented Medicaid Expansion as of July
1, 2022. Missouri did not start taking applications until October 1, 2021, but pursuant to a court
order the applications were retroactive until July 1, 2021. See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra
note 24.
30
Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor
Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-thatdo-not-expand-medicaid/.
31
See generally Meghana Ammula & Robin Rudowitz, Federal Policy May Temporarily
Close the Coverage Gap, but Long-Term Coverage May Fall Back to States, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/federal-policy-may-temporarily-close-thecoverage-gap-but-long-term-coverage-may-fall-back-to-states/; John Holahan & Michael
Simpson, Filling the Medicaid Gap With a Public Option, URB. INST. (July 14, 2021),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/filling-medicaid-gap-publicoption#:~:text=Federal%20spending%20for%20the%20Medicaid,depending%20on%20the%20s
ubsidy%20schedule; Dave Muoio, Closing Medicaid Gap With a Public Option Would Save
Federal Government Billions, Analysis Says, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (July 15, 2021, 7:30 AM),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/closing-medicaid-gap-a-public-option-would-savefederal-government-billions-analysis-says.
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will be successful in creating greater financial stability for rural health care
providers and the communities they serve. In Part II, it will examine the existing
research and literature regarding rural hospital closures since 2010 and how a
state’s decision to adopt Medicaid Expansion impacts closures and economic
stability for the entire community. It will further outline the efforts to incentivize
Medicaid Expansion through the American Rescue Plan of 2021,32 and survey
other proposals at federal and state levels aimed at creating greater sustainability
for hospital providers in rural markets. In Part III, the Article will compare rural
hospitals in expansion states to those in non-expansion states to ascertain whether
the expectations for Medicaid Expansion will meet reality. This Part will also
analyze the legislative climate in those states that have yet to expand their
Medicaid coverage for purposes of understanding the likelihood of success in
current efforts. In Part IV, this Article will argue that current incentive-based
efforts to close the Medicaid coverage gap in the twelve remaining states that
have not yet adopted Medicaid Expansion are unlikely to be successful due to
political barriers in those states, both actual and perceived. It will further argue
that narrowing or closing the coverage gap nevertheless remains a vital aspect of
stabilizing health access and resources in rural communities and that federal
efforts to continue to narrow or close that gap should continue. Even if these
efforts will not save all hospitals, increasing health access through other forms
of providers such as emergency-only services will still require a largely insured
population for long-term stability. Part V will then conclude by offering a few
suggestions regarding where federal regulators and legislators should focus their
efforts to stem the tide of rural hospital closure and instability and further
endeavor to suggest ways in which current proposed bills might better target
specific issues that will bolster the health care infrastructure of rural
communities. This issue needs to be addressed with great urgency to prevent
further gaps in the urban-rural health care divide.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Status of Rural Health
The challenges of providing access to high quality health care to
individuals living in rural communities have been long-standing, vexing federal
and state regulators and legislators for years.33 United States Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) first established the Federal Office of Rural
Health Policy (“FORHP”) in 1987 to “advise HHS on the effects that federal
health care policies and regulations have on the financial viability of small rural
hospitals and access to health care in rural areas.”34 Thus, the federal
government, along with various state governments and non-profit organizations
32

American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 247 (2021).

33

See generally Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 1.
See id.

34
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and associations, have been studying the unique nature and dynamics of rural
communities to address and respond to the specific needs and obstacles to health
access in rural areas.35 In a 2018 report, the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) reported that FORHP had found that 48% of the 2,250 acute care
hospitals across the nation are considered to be rural,36 serving approximately
18% of the United States population.37 FORHP identified some key
characteristics of rural populations that contribute to challenges regarding health
care services generally: (1) rural counties contain a higher percentage of elderly
residents as compared to urban communities; (2) individuals who experience
limitations in their activities due to chronic conditions constitute a higher
percentage of the population in rural areas than in urban areas; and (3) individuals
living in rural counties earn a lower median household income than their urban
counterparts.38 These challenges are exacerbated by changing dynamics in rural
communities, including declining populations in rural areas and slower
employment growth.39
Declining populations have specifically exacerbated health disparities,
as younger, healthier people have left rural areas, leaving beyond a population
that is, on average, older and has higher injury and smoking rates.40 The Centers
for Disease Control (“CDC”) conducted a series of studies, released in 2017,
focused on various health statistics for rural adults, including racial and ethnic
health disparities, occupational health risks, illicit drug use and drug overdose

35
See, e.g., Jack Hoadley, Karina Wagnerman, Joan Alker, & Mark Holmes, Medicaid in
Small Towns and Rural America: A Lifeline for Children, Families, and Communities, GEO. UNIV.
CTR. FOR CHILD. AND FAM. 9 (June 2017), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/Rural-health-final.pdf; Wendy Long, Will Cromer, Gabe Roberts, &
William Aaron, FY2018 Budget Presentation, TENN. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & ADMIN. 3 (Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/governorsoffice-documents/governorsofficedocuments/TennCare.pdf.;
Rural
Health
Policy,
RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB,
https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/topics/rural-health-policy (last visited Mar. 8, 2022); The Rural
Health Safety Net Under Pressure: Rural Hospital Vulnerability, THE CHARTIS GROUP (Feb. 2020),
https://www.chartis.com/forum/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CCRH_VulnerabilityResearch_FiNAL-02.14.20.pdf.
36

See Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 3. According to the GAO Report, FORHP
“identifies ZIP Codes as rural if they are in: (i) a non-metropolitan county; (ii) a metropolitan
county, but with a Rural-Urban Commuting Area code of 4 or higher; or (iii) one of 132 large and
sparsely populated census tracts with a Rural-Urban Commuting Area code of 2 or 3.” See Rural
Hospital Report 2020, supra note 11, at 2 n.3.
37
Amazingly, these hospitals are located in areas that constitute 84% of the U.S. land area.
This means that 82% of the U.S. population lives and receives care in only 16% of the land area of
the entire county. See Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 3–4. These statistics are
unchanged in a subsequent report in 2020. See Rural Hospital Report 2020, supra note 11, at 2.
38
Rural Hospital Report 2018, supra note 13, at 4.
39

Id. at 4–5.
According to the CDC, the rural population declined by almost half from 1970 to 2015. U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2016: WITH CHARTBOOK ON LONGTERM TRENDS IN HEALTH 15 (2017).
40
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deaths, suicide risks, motor vehicle deaths, breast and other cancer incidences,
air quality, diabetes self-management programs, mental health disorders, healthrelated behaviors, and leading causes of death.41 Among the various reports, it is
clear that rural populations experience greater health disparities than their urban
counterparts. For example, in 2004 the drug overdose death rates for both urban
and rural areas converged, and since 2014 drug overdose deaths in rural areas
have eclipsed those in urban areas.42 By 2015, 17 per 100,000 individuals in nonmetropolitan areas were dying of drug overdoses as compared to 16.2 per
100,000 individuals in metropolitan areas.43 Similarly, suicide rates are higher in
rural areas, as opposed to urban communities, with suicide by firearms occurring
at nearly double that in metropolitan areas.44 Moreover, mental health resources
are also more scarce in rural areas, and there is a higher percentage of children
in rural areas that live in a home with a parent who has a mental, behavioral, and
development disorder (“MBDD”) and experience financial disparities at a
greater extent than children in urban settings.45 Whether health disparities in rural
populations are a symptom of failing hospitals or the cause is not entirely clear,
but the continued closure of hospitals and reduction of access in rural areas will
contribute to and intensify health disparities.
When considering the types of services and providers that are available
in rural areas, the Governmental Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report
in 2020 comparing services in counties without hospital closures to counties with
hospital closures.46 Without comment as to the cause or effect of provider
financial instability, the GAO noted that counties without hospital closures had
a greater percentage of service offerings at their hospital.47 Most notably,
counties without closures had a great percentage of hospital-based outpatient

41
See Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR): MMRW Rural Health Series, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/rural_health_series.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2022).
42

Karin A. Mack, Christopher M. Jones & Michael F. Ballesteros, Illicit Drug Use, Illicit
Drug Use Disorders, and Drug Overdose Deaths in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas—
United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/ss6619a1.htm?s_cid=ss6619a1_w.
43

Id.
Asha Z. Ivey-Stephenson, Alex E. Crosby, Shane P.D. Jack, Tadesse Haileyesus, et al.,
Suicide Trends Among and Within Urbanization Levels by Sex, Race/Ethnicity, Age Group, and
Mechanism of Death—United States, 2001-2015, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct.
6, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/ss6618a1.htm.
45
Lara R. Robinson, Joseph R. Holbrook, Rebecca H. Bitsko, Sophie A. Hartwig, et al.,
Differences in Health Care, Family, and Community Factors Associated with Mental, Behavioral,
and Development Disorders Among Children Aged 2–8 Years in Rural and Urban Areas—United
States, 2011–2012, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/ss6608a1.htm.
44

46
47

Rural Hospital Report 2020, supra note 11, at 12–13.
Id.
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services available.48 For example, in 2017, in counties with hospital closures,
only 34.9% of the hospitals offered hospital-based outpatient care centers
whereas 65.8% of hospitals in counties without closures had these services.49
Similarly, only 36.5% of hospitals in counties with closures offered outpatient
surgery in 2017, whereas 72.7% of the hospitals in counties without closures
provided that same service that year.50 These same findings were true for other
outpatient services such as a free-standing outpatient care centers, urgent care
centers, and pain management services; in all instances, the counties without
closures offered a greater percentage of these services.51 It is difficult to glean
causation from these statistics. Did patients stop seeking care at hospitals in
counties with closures due to quality or other concerns, thus reducing and
limiting the services these distressed hospitals were able to provide? Or, did the
hospitals in counties with closures start reducing or limiting services to save
money or reduce expense, which in turn drove patients to seek care in counties
without closures where hospital services are more robust? The GAO noted:
The reductions in these hospitals from 2012 to 2017 may have
affected residents’ utilization of health care services. For
example, HHS data show that from 2012 to 2017, the median
rate of hospital outpatient visits per 1,000 Medicare FFS
beneficiaries declined among those in services areas with rural
hospital closures, but increased among those in service areas
without closures.52
It is not clear from this statement whether the hospitals had made
conscious decisions to reduce or limit services or whether it was driven by
already declining patient volumes. Regardless, the information makes clear that
the availability and accessibility of robust care involving a variety of inpatient
and outpatient services are critical to support ongoing access and services.
Additionally, there has been a dramatic shift in the last 20 years to
outpatient services away from inpatient services, and outpatient services on
average tend to wield higher margins than inpatient services.53 Medicaid

48

Id.

49

Id. at 12.
Id.

50
51
52

Id. at 13.
Id.

53
Pooja Kumar & Ramya Parthasarathy, Walking Out of the Hospital: The Continued Rise of
Ambulatory Care and How to Take Advantage of It, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/walking-outof-the-hospital-the-continued-rise-of-ambulatory-care-and-how-to-take-advantage-of-it; see also,
A Primer on Interpreting Hospital Margins, THE CECIL G. SHEPS CTR FOR HEALTH SERVS. RSCH.,
UNIV.
OF
N.C.
(July
2003),
https://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10//Primer.pdf (noting a shift that took place after 1999 due to a revision in
the applicable regulations that reduced or eliminated the incentive that hospitals had to “maximize
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Expansion with its provision of increased funding for indigent patients—even if
Medicaid pays only pennies on the dollar—has to be a factor as to viability, given
that the West and the South offer approximately the same amount of outpatient
services on average (67% and 66%, respectively) and the Northeast has a
substantially lower percentage (58%),54 and yet the number of hospital closures
in 2010 is just six hospitals in the West and eight hospitals in the Northeast, as
compared to 72 hospitals in the South.55 Consistent with reports regarding the
financial viability of Jellico Medical Center before its closing, the GAO noted
that rural hospitals that ultimately closed were financially distressed in the years
leading up to the closure.56 The median margins for rural hospitals were already
in decline in the two years prior to the hospital’s closure.57 When looking at
currently distressed hospitals, The North Carolina Rural Hospital Research
Project has found large increases in the percentage of rural hospitals in the South
that are already financially distressed, consistent with the increased number of
hospital closures in this region relative to other regions in the U.S.58
While rural populations tend to be more racially and ethnically
homogenous than urban areas, it should be noted that Hispanics are the fastest
growing segment of the rural population, currently accounting for approximately
8.6% of the rural population.59 This is important to note when considering
existing health disparities, as studies have shown that there is a disproportionate
impact of a lack of Medicaid Expansion on individuals who are African
American and Hispanic because these populations have a higher percentage of
individuals who are living in poverty.60 For example, African Americans
constitute 20% of the Medicaid population, but represent only 13.4% of the total

reimbursement by allocating more overhead costs to outpatient areas. Thus, artificially low
outpatient margins are built into the new payment system.”).
54
See A Primer on Interpreting Hospital Margins, supra note 53.
55
56

Rural Hospital Report 2020, supra note 11, at 8.
Id. at 20; see also Sullivan, supra note 7.

57
See Rural Hospital Report 2020, supra note 11 (noting a 3.3% decline in margin in the 2
years prior and then to 13.8% decline in the margin in the year prior to the closure).
58

Id. at 14; Rural Hospital Closures, supra note 23.
Racial and Ethnic Minorities Made up About 22 Percent of the Rural Population in 2018,
Compared to 43 Percent in Urban Areas, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Oct. 13,
2020),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chartdetail/?chartId=99538#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20Whites%20accounted%20for,19.8%20perce
nt%20of%20urban%20areas.
59

60

See Renee M. Landers, Buffering Against Vicissitude: The Role of Social Insurance in the
COVID-19 Pandemic and in Maintaining Economic Stability, 49 GA. J. OF INT’L & COMPAR. L.
505, 518 (2021) (citing Jesse Cross-Call & Matt Broaddus, States That Have Expanded Medicaid
Are Better Positioned to Address COVID-19 and Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (July 14, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/states-that-have-expandedmedicaid-are-better-positioned-to-address-covid-19-and).
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population in the U.S.61 Similarly, 29.3% of Medicaid recipients are Hispanic,
but individuals who identify as Hispanic or Latino make up only 18.5% of the
national population.62 Granted, as of right now many of these individuals dwell
in more urban areas, but this highlights another challenge that is presented as
some of the demographics shift and when considering the individual impact of
the Medicaid program more holistically.
B. Medicaid Expansion and Hospital Closure Risk
While certain gaps in health care services have existed in rural and urban
communities for some time, the differences began to widen rather significantly
when Medicaid Expansion was first made available to the states as part of the
ACA.63 Prior to the COVID-19 public health emergency, of a total Medicaid
population of 75.2 million individuals, approximately 15.3 million individuals
were enrolled in Medicaid Expansion.64 In addition, about 4.3 million people in
the twelve non-Expansion states would have been eligible for Medicaid
Expansion, if their states had expanded.65 This means that nearly 20 million
individuals, the majority of whom were uninsured or underinsured prior to the
ACA, would now have state Medicaid insurance. Approximately 2.2 million of
the four million living in non-expansion states fall into what is referred to as the
“coverage gap,” which is the population of individuals who earn greater than the
maximum income eligible for their state’s Medicaid coverage, but less than the
minimum required to be eligible for subsidies and credits on the insurance
exchange.66 The remaining 1.8 million individuals earn enough to qualify for
subsidies and credits to purchase private insurance on a health insurance
exchange, but would qualify for Medicaid (presumably at a lower cost to the
individual) if the state had adopted Medicaid Expansion.67 More than one-third
of those in the “coverage gap” live in Texas and approximately 40% reside in the
states of Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina.68 As a corollary, Texas leads the
country in the number of hospital closures, and North Carolina and Georgia are

61
See Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-distribution-nonelderlyby-raceethnicity/;
Quick
Facts, U.S.
CENSUS
(July
1,
2021),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US.
62
Id.
63
64

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(y)(2)(A) (West 2022).
See Garfield et al., supra note 30.

65

Id.
Id. The current minimum income for eligibility for subsidies and credits on the health
insurance exchanges is 100% of the federal poverty level.
67
Id.
66

68
Id. (noting that, of those individuals in the Coverage Gap, 19% are from Florida, 12% are
from Georgia, and 10% are from North Carolina).
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tied for fourth-most, with six hospital closures each since 2013.69 In contrast,
there are only two states outside the south that had four or more closures since
2013: Kansas, which has had four closures, and Missouri, which has had six
closures.70 Notably, Kansas has not adopted Medicaid Expansion and Missouri
adopted Medicaid Expansion via state ballot measure, which became effective
as of July 2021.71
The possibility of Medicaid availability for up to 20 million people for
whom it was not previously available is impactful. With a more elderly and less
wealthy population in rural areas, it is not surprising that “rural hospitals are
more reliant on public payers and have lower operating margins.”72 From when
Medicaid Expansion was first made optional, studies showed a correlation
between Medicaid Expansion and increased stability for rural markets:
“[S]tudies have shown that, on average, Medicaid revenues and Medicaidcovered hospital discharges have increased more, and charity care (care for
which no payment is expected) and bad debt (unrecoverable debt) have decreased
more, in states that have expanded Medicaid that in those that have not.”73
The Chartis Group undertook an extensive study into the various factors
that impact hospital closures in a state and identified nine indicators as having a
significant impact.74 The report listed the following significant indicators:
average age of plan, case mix index, government control status, percentage
capital efficiency, percentage change total revenue, percentage occupancy,
percentage outpatient revenue, system affiliation, and state-level Medicaid
Expansion.75 Medicaid Expansion status was one of the highest impacts overall,
finding that “being located in a Medicaid expansion state decreases the likelihood
of closure by 62 percent on average.”76 In fact, Medicaid Expansion status was
second only to Government Control Status, which was shown to decrease the
likelihood of closure by 70% on average.77 The report then used this information
to chart and anticipate the vulnerability of rural hospitals going forward.78 Not

69

See Rural Hospital Closure Report 2020, supra note 11, at 8. Tennessee comes in second
with 12 hospital closures since 2013 followed by Oklahoma in third with seven hospital closures.
70
71

Id.
Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.

72
See Brystana G. Kaufman, Medicaid Expansion Affects Rural and Urban Hospitals
Differently,
35
HEALTH
AFFS.,
no.
9
1665,
1665
(Sep.
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0357.
73
Id.
74
75

The Rural Health Safety Net Under Pressure, supra note 35, at 3.
Id.

76

Id. at 4.
Id. at 8. Government Control Status is presumed in the report as “[h]aving—or securing—
government control status opens doors to additional funding and access to resources.” Government
control would be when the hospital has some sort of status that enables government funding,
including being operated by a county, city, or municipality, or by the federal government.
78
Id. at 6.
77
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unlike statistics regarding hospital closures that have taken place thus far since
2010, the report identified that states located in the southwest and lower Great
Plains are the most vulnerable for additional closures, identifying an additional
36 hospitals in Texas and 19 in Kansas.79 Tennessee has only 48 rural hospitals
total, but 25 of those are considered “vulnerable” and 15 are considered “most
vulnerable.”80 This constitutes 52% of the state’s hospitals being considered as
vulnerable.81 Texas was a close second with 51% of its hospitals considered to
be vulnerable (of a total rural hospital count of 152), and Missouri, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, Kansas, and Wyoming all have 30%
or more of their hospitals considered vulnerable.82 At the time the report was
issued, none of the states in this list had adopted Medicaid Expansion.83
Unsurprisingly, failure to adopt Medicaid Expansion, which impacts
hospital financial stability, has also led to a decline in access to care in nonexpansion states. Several studies have concluded that Medicaid Expansion is
“associated with great improvements in access to care in rural areas, including
increased HIV diagnosis and access to mental health care.”84 Further, other
studies have also indicated that rural hospitals that were located in states that
have expanded their Medicaid programs lead to “substantial improvements in
financial performance.”85 Thus, it is not simply that lack of Medicaid expansion
exacerbates existing challenges, but that Medicaid Expansion bolsters and
supports hospitals that might otherwise be financially weak.
Despite the available evidence for state legislators and governors
regarding the benefits of Medicaid Expansion for rural hospitals and thus in turn
the benefits for the economy of the community overall, adoption of expansion in
remaining states has been significantly slowed since its first opportunity for
adoption in 2014. By the end of 2015, 28 states had adopted Medicaid
Expansion.86 Another two states adopted expansion in 2016, and the remaining
nine states expanded their Medicaid programs within the last two to three years,
the majority of which did it by statewide ballot, thereby bypassing their governor

79
80
81
82

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.

83
Missouri later expanded its Medicaid program through state ballot, which was effective as
of July 1, 2021. See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
84
Madeline Guth & Meghana Ammula, Building on the Evidence Base: Studies on the Effects
of Medicaid Expansion, February 2020 to March 2021, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 6, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/building-on-the-evidence-base-studies-on-the-effects-ofmedicaid-expansion-february-2020-to-march-2021-report/.
85
86

Id.
Id.
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and/or legislature.87 Some of those states that expanded based on ballot initiatives
had to fight in court to implement Medicaid Expansion when legislatures or
governors actively fought against implementation.88
C. Current Legislative Efforts
With the benefits of Medicaid Expansion in mind and the goal of full
implementation of the ACA as envisioned, the U.S. Congress sought to
reinvigorate the push for states to implement Medicaid Expansion. In 2021,
Congress enacted The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARPA”).89 In
general, the ARPA is intended as a stimulus bill to build on some of the aid and
measures set forth in the two previous stimulus plans: the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”)90 and the Consolidate
Appropriations Act.91 Like the other two stimulus plans before it, the bulk of the
provisions under the ARPA are intended to infuse cash into the hands of
individuals and businesses impacted by measures adopted for health and safety
reasons under the COVID-19 public health emergency.92 As such, the primary
provisions of the ARPA focus on providing or supplementing individual income,
including the provision of $1,400 personal checks, an increase to the Child Tax
Credit, Earned-Income Tax Credit, and Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit,
an extension of unemployment insurance, monetary support for small businesses,
and a reduction in health insurance premiums and provision of 100% COBRA
subsidy.93 Importantly, there are several provisions under the ARPA that impact

87
Id. Idaho, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Utah all approved Medicaid
Expansion through a ballot initiative when their state governors and/or state legislatures either
refused to act or actively worked against expansion.
88
See, e.g., Maine Governor Sued After Refusing to Implement Medicaid Expansion That
Voters OK’d Months Ago, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 1, 2018) (“Maine Gov. Paul LePage (R)
says he won’t expand the program until state lawmakers find a way to fund it under his conditions,
despite voters’ approval of a ballot initiative with nearly 60 percent support.”).
89
90

American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 247 (2021).
CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).

91

Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2021).
See American Rescue Plan: President Biden’s Plan to Provide Direct Relief to Americans,
Contain
COVID-19,
and
Rescue
the
Economy,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/american-rescue-plan/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2022) (“The American
Rescue Plan is delivering direct relief to the American people, rescuing the American economy,
and starting to beat the virus.”).
92

93
Id. COBRA refers to a federal program that “provides workers and their families who lose
their health benefits the right to choose to continue group health benefits provided by their group
health plan for limited periods of time under certain circumstances such as voluntary or involuntary
job loss, reduction in the hours worked, transition between jobs, death, divorce, and other life
events.”
Continuation
of
Health
Coverage,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/cobra (last visited Mar. 8, 2022). This law was
originally enacted in the 1990s to prevent situations in which a person who leaves one job for
whatever reason and then also loses access to health insurance because the insurance was provided
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Medicaid specifically. First, to encourage the twelve states that have not
expanded their Medicaid program,94 the law provides an additional 5% increase
to the state’s traditional federal matching rate for Medicaid beneficiaries, which
is in addition to the 90% federal matching funds already available under the
ACA.95 By way of background, under the traditional Medicaid program, states
receive on average approximately two-thirds matching funds from the federal
government to support a state’s Medicaid population.96 That is, the federal
government pays approximately two-thirds of the cost of Medicaid and the states
pay approximately one-third of the cost. When the ACA was enacted, the federal
matching funds remained unchanged for the traditional Medicaid population.97
The ACA added a new category of Medicaid eligibility: individuals who did not
qualify for traditional Medicaid but earned less than 138%98 of the Federal
Poverty Level.99 For this new so-called expansion population, the federal
government provided matching funds far more than the typical two-thirds
matching available under the traditional Medicaid program.100 In fact, in fiscal
years 2014, 2015, and 2016, the federal government provided 100% federal

through an employer. It also was intended to avoid a situation in which the individual was without
coverage for a time, thereby potentially exposing that person to the possibility that a future
employer could deny the individual for pre-existing conditions.
94
It also applied to Oklahoma and Missouri, which were both in the process of implementing
Medicaid Expansion in 2021 pursuant to state ballot. See MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid
Provisions in the American Rescue Plan, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-provisions-in-the-american-rescue-plan-act/.
95

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(e) (West 2022).
“Under the formula, the federal share (FMAP) varies by state from a floor of 50 percent to
a high of 78 percent for FY 2022[]. States may receive higher FMAPs for certain services or
populations. In 2019, the federal government paid 64 percent of total Medicaid costs with the
states paying 36 percent.” Robin Rudowitz, Elizabeth Williams, Elizabeth Hinon & Rachel
Garfield, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 7, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-financing-the-basics-issuebrief/#:~:text=The%20ACA%20provided%20100%20percent,to%2090%20percent%20by%202
020).&text=In%20general%2C%20costs%20incurred%20by,at%20a%2050%20percent%20rate.
97
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(y)(2)(A) (identifying the “Newly Eligible Mandatory
Individuals”).
98
Id. § 18051(e)(1)(B) (West 2022). Note that the language of the ACA describes the newly
eligible as those with an income of less than 133% of the federal poverty level; however, there is
a 5% income disregard, thus the actual amount that is permitted is income less than 138% of the
federal poverty level. See id. § 1396a(e)(14)(I)(i).
99
The “Federal Poverty Level” is a term established under Section 673(2) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1991 (“OBRA”) for the purpose of directing the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to establish poverty thresholds, established based on the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers to determine eligibility for Medicaid and other federal health care
programs. HHS determines income thresholds each year based on family size. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 673(2), 95 Stat. 357, 512 (1981). For example,
the Federal Poverty Level for a family of four for the year 2022 is an annual income of $27,750.
138% of that figure is $37,295.
100
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(y)(1)(A).
96
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matching.101 Funds were then slowly reduced over time from 95% federal
matching for 2017, 94% federal matching for 2018, 93% federal matching for
2019, and finally 90% federal matching for 2020 and beyond.102 Because of this
new incentive under the ARPA, states that elect to expand their Medicaid
programs at this point are eligible for 95% federal matching for up to two years
after initial expansion, rather than the previous maximum of 90%.103 The
intention behind the two-year increase is to offset the expense that states incur
by adding the expansion category under their programs.104
In addition to the expansion incentives, the ARPA provides states with
the option to extend Medicaid coverage for post-partum women from its current
60 days to up to one year.105 This option is available beginning on April 1, 2022,
and continues for five years.106 Women who are eligible under this benefit qualify
for full benefits, not just coverage of pregnancy-related benefits.107
Importantly for rural populations, the ARPA provides funding of $8.5
billion for the fiscal year 2021 to be paid to rural providers who provide services
to Medicaid, CHIP, and Medicare beneficiaries.108 The intention is to reimburse
rural health care providers “for health care related expenses and lost revenues
that are attributable to COVID-19.”109 Providers are required to submit an
application to the Secretary of HHS setting forth the need of the provider for the
payment, which documentation includes: statement justifying the provider’s
need along with documentation showing expenses and lost revenues attributable
to COVID-19; tax identification number of the provider; any assurances as may
be required by HHS and any ongoing reports as may be required to ensure
compliance with applicable regulations; and any other information that the
Secretary deems necessary or appropriate.110 To be eligible, a provider or
supplier must be enrolled in either the Medicare program or the state’s Medicaid
and/or CHIP programs; provide diagnoses, testing, or care for individuals with
possible or actual cases of COVID-19; and be a rural provider or supplier.111 This
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id.
Id. § 1396d(ii).
See Musumeci, supra note 94.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(e)(4).
Id.
Id.; see also Musumeci, supra note 94.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b-26(a).
Id.
Id. § 1320b-26(b).

Id. § 1320b-26(e). To be considered a “rural” provider or supplier, the provider or supplier
must meet the following definition: “(A) a provider or supplier located in a rural area (as defined
in Section 1395ww(d)(2)(D) of this title); or [] provider treated as located in a rural area pursuant
to Section 1395ww(d)(8)(E) of this title; (B) a provider or supplier located in any other area that
serves rural patients [including] a metropolitan statistical area with a population of less than
500,000 . . .; (C) a rural health clinic . . .; (D) a provider or supplier that furnishes home health,
111
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report is a temporary measure to address current financial exigencies and
vulnerabilities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and thus will be a good
lifeline for some hospital providers, but not a long-term fix to more complicated
and long-standing financial stability that might be caused by lack of Medicaid
Expansion.
A bill circulating through Congress known as the Build Back Better Act
proposes a structure that would bypass the states altogether and offer Medicaid
Expansion to the identified population through a federal program.112 The bill in
its current form contains a provision in which individuals who fall into the
coverage gap would be able to receive subsidies to purchase insurance on the
federal health insurance exchange, commonly known as healthcare.gov.113 As
proposed in the bill, the Secretary of HHS would establish a so-called “Federal
Medicaid Program” no later than January 1, 2025, that would enable individuals
living in non-expansion states, referred to in the bill as “coverage gap States,” to
purchase insurance on the federal exchange with subsidies from the federal
government.114 This will primarily be implemented through contracts with thirdparty Medicaid managed care organizations and third-party administrators.115
The current bill still provides some incentive for states to adopt Medicaid
Expansion on their own, as opposed to waiting for this federal option, as states
that have expanded their Medicaid population will be eligible for 93% federal
matching through as opposed to the current rate of 90% federal matching.116 This
provision is likely more so to secure states that have already expanded their
Medicaid programs to keep those programs intact as opposed to trying to
incentivize the states that have yet to expand. One key challenge is that the
funding for this program is only contemplated in the bill as extending through
2025, likely due to the cost of the bill overall and competing interests in funding
various infrastructure projects.117

hospice, or long-term services and supports in an individual’s home located in a rural area . . .; or
any other rural provider or supplier . . . “ 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b-26(e)(5) (West 2022).
112
Build Back Better Act, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021). It should be clarified that technically
the “coverage gap” is those individuals who earn below 100% of the Federal Poverty Level because
those individuals are not eligible for Medicaid in non-expansion states, but are also not eligible for
any subsidies or credits on the health insurance exchanges. In contrast, individuals who earn above
100% of the Federal Poverty Level, but less than 138% of the Federal Poverty Level are currently
eligible for subsidies and credits on the health insurance exchanges, but would otherwise be eligible
for Medicaid. Many individuals in this latter category are unable to afford insurance even with the
subsidies and credits. See Katie Keith, House Passes Build Back Better Act, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov.
23, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20211123.122022.
113
114
115
116

H.R. 5376, § 30701.
Id. § 30701(a).
Id. § 30701(b).
Id.

117
Brett Kelman, Tennessee GOP Can’t Stop Biden’s Medicaid Expansion ‘Workaround’
Plan, THE TENNESSEAN (Nov. 16, 2021).
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There are several concerns that have been raised about these provisions,
beyond generalized concerns raised regarding the costs of the bill overall.118
First, while there is funding in the bill for outreach efforts to explain this option
to individuals, it could nevertheless be confusing for the consumer. Despite the
moniker of Federal Medicaid Expansion, individuals who sign up for a thirdparty insurance product on the insurance exchange and would not be made part
of the state’s Medicaid program.119 Further, the coverage under a commercial
plan will be different than Medicaid coverage and may end up being more costly
for the individual despite the subsidies.120 According to Kaiser Family
Foundation,
While some states require nominal co-payments for certain
services, Marketplace coverage under the Build Back Better Act
will likely require higher cost sharing for some enrollees than
what they would have paid in Medicaid. (While plans with cost
sharing subsidies have very low deductibles and copays for most
services, coinsurance might apply for key costly services, such
as hospitalization, emergency room care, or specialty drugs).121
Kaiser Family Foundation also points out that Medicaid in many states
applies retroactive coverage for up to three months prior to the application date,
but commercial insurance plans purchased on the insurance marketplace are all
prospective and would only cover care from the first day of the month following
plan selection—typically.122 One additional consideration relates to the available
network for marketplace plans as compared to Medicaid plans. Health insurance
products offered on the exchange tend to provide narrower networks on average,
which might limit the available providers who may be accessible from these
plans as compared to being enrolled in the state’s Medicaid program.123

118
See Press Release, Joe Manchin, Senator, Manchin Statement on Build Back Better Act,
(Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-statementon-build-back-better-act.
119

See Kelman, supra note 117.
Cynthia Cox, Jennifer Tolbert, Robin Rudowitz & Karen Pollitz, Build Back Better Would
Change the Ways Low-Income People Get Health Insurance, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 14,
2021), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/build-back-better-would-change-the-wayslow-income-people-get-healthinsurance/#:~:text=If%20passed%2C%20the%20Build%20Back,through%20a%20non%2Dexpa
nsion%20pathway.
121
Id.
120

122

Id.
Id.; see also Deborah R. Farringer, Everything Old Is New Again: Will Narrow Networks
Succeed Where HMOs Failed?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 303 (2016). It should be noted that
network adequacy within traditional Medicaid programs and Medicaid management care plans
have been criticized as providing fewer than necessary providers who are willing to provide
services to Medicaid patients. Therefore, while this is a risk, network adequacy remains
123
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Regardless of the benefits or potential negative impacts of the bill, at this
point there is no guarantee that the Build Back Better Plan will pass in its current
form. Thus, it is possible that the Medicaid Expansion proposals set forth in the
bill currently are not ultimately enacted. The proposed language, however,
provides some insight into the lack of confidence many have regarding the
likelihood that non-expansion states accept any incentives from the ARPA or
hope that the coverage gap will be closed through state action.
III.

REACTION TO EXISTING INCENTIVES AND PRESSURES

A. Political Landscape
Since the publication of National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius in 2012,124 the efforts to implement the intentions of the ACA have been
challenging. Once the Supreme Court had established that states were no longer
required by law to expand their Medicaid programs to low-income individuals
who are not otherwise categorically eligible, the issue of whether to expand a
state’s Medicaid program became divide—not universally but in large part—
down party-lines politically.125 In fact, when Medicaid Expansion became
effective in January 2014, 25 states adopted Medicaid Expansion, with another
three adopting it by January 2015.126 Of these 28 states, ten had Republican
governors: New Jersey, Ohio, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Michigan,
Iowa, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Indiana.127 Even in those states, not all of the
efforts to expand were without controversy. For example, John Kasich’s efforts
in Ohio were ultimately successful through the authority of a special legislative
panel, which Kasich formed because the Ohio legislature had opposed Medicaid
Expansion and refused to go along with Kasich’s efforts to expand.128 This was
only after the Ohio Supreme Court determined the authority of the special
legislative panel to take such action was valid.129 Six of the states did not accept
the Medicaid Expansion program as set forth under the ACA, but instead agreed
to extended coverage to the expansion population as part of other programs or

problematic under Medicaid plans in general as well. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Care Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015).
124
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
125
Andrew Prokop, The Battle over Medicaid Expansion in 2013 and 2014 Explained, VOX
(May 12, 2015, 3:46 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/1/27/18088994/medicaid-expansionexplained.
126
See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
127

See Prokop, supra note 125.
Id.; see Catherine Candisky, Ohio Supreme Court Upholds Kasich’s Expansion of Medicaid,
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Dec.
21,
2013,
10:07
AM),
https://www.dispatch.com/story/lifestyle/health-fitness/2013/12/20/ohio-supreme-court-upholdskasich/23464827007/.
129
See Candisky, supra note 128.
128
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mechanisms via the Section 1115 waiver program.130 Many of those states that
elected waivers did so in order to add other restrictions or limitations on the
Medicaid programs such as work requirements or the expansion population
having access only to third-party insurance.131
After the initial adoption, Medicaid Expansion became a particularly
challenging endeavor among certain Republican leaders for a few reasons. First,
many Republicans still firmly believed that, either through legislative efforts or
ongoing legal challenges in the courts, the ACA would ultimately be repealed.132
If the ACA were repealed and state Medicaid programs had already added this
new expansion population to the rolls, then the federal money would no longer
be available and states would have to decide whether to remove all of those
newly added individuals or fund the new population itself.133 Moreover, other
critics simply felt Medicaid was already a poorly run and failing program prior
to expansion, and adding new individuals to the program will do little to improve
health access and outcomes for this particular population.134
Since the initial wave of expansion adoption, the remaining states have
been slow to act, with only 11 additional states expanding their Medicaid
programs after January 1, 2015.135 Moreover, all but two states that have
expanded Medicaid have done so without support from either the governor, the
legislature, or both.136 Between 2015 and 2016, three of the four states that
expanded did so pursuant to executive authority only—without action from the
legislature.137 Following a hiatus of any expansions in 2017 and 2018, six
additional states have implemented Medicaid Expansion since 2019 and all but
one did so via state-wide ballot.138 Thus, more recent actions bypassed governors
and legislatures altogether.

130

See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.

131

Id. (noting that Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and Utah all adopted
expansion via Section 1115 waivers “to operate their Medicaid expansion programs in ways not
otherwise allowed under federal law. In some states, these included previously-approved Section
1115 work requirements that have since been withdrawn by CMS under the Biden
Administration.”).
132
See Prokop, supra note 125.
133

Id.
See id. (“Medicaid’s very cheapness means that it has to reimburse doctors at lower rates,
and as a result, it’s sometimes difficult to find a doctor who accepts Medicaid.”).
135
See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
134

136

Erin Brantley & Sara Rosenbaum, Ballot Initiatives Have Brought Medicaid Eligibility to
Many but Cannot Solve the Coverage Gap, HEALTH AFFS. (Jun. 23, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210617.992286/full/#:~:text=Since%20201
4%2C%20only%20two%20states,was%20signed%20by%20the%20governor (noting that only
Virginia and Montana have adopted Medicaid Expansion following a bill passed by the legislature
and then signed by the governor).
137
138

Id.
Id.
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While these ballot initiatives have been relatively successful,139 more
recent efforts in some of the 12 states that have yet to expand have been met with
greater obstacles. Florida and South Dakota have ongoing efforts to expand via
a statewide ballot, but no action has yet been taken.140 Of the remaining states,
none have the ability currently to introduce a voter-driven ballot initiative
process.141 Mississippi’s struggles were laid bare in a very recent case,
invalidating the ballot initiative process.142 Unrelated to Medicaid Expansion,
Mississippi’s Supreme Court issued a ruling on May 14, 2021, invalidating a
medical marijuana proposal because the process for enabling such a proposal is
“outdated and unworkable.”143 In order to pass any other initiatives, the entire
process would need to be reorganized through the state legislature.144
Even if the ballot initiatives pass in the three states in which ballot
initiatives are possible—Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming—it would still
only provide coverage for approximately one-quarter of the individuals currently
in the coverage gap.145 Texas, with an anticipated 1,665,000 individuals who
could be added under expansion, constitutes 30% of the total potential expansion
population.146 Moreover, there is no possibility of a voter-led initiative and no
indication from Governor Abbott that he will be undertaking expansion any time
soon.147 The Texas legislature did propose a bill in April 2021 that would

139
The ballot initiatives have not been without some controversy. For example, then-Governor
LePage in Maine refused to implement expansion after the ballot passed unless the legislature
agreed to certain demands. After six months of inaction, 80,000 low-income Maine adults who
were supposed to qualify for the benefits sued the Maine Department of Health and Human
Services. See Rachana Pradhan, Maine Governor Sued for Defying Medicaid Expansion Ballot
Measure, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2018, 1:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/30/lepagesued-medicaid-expansion-ballot-measure-559952. The issue was ultimately resolved when a new
governor was elected, and she proceeded to implement expansion as of her first day in office. See
Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
140
See Brantley & Rosenbaum, supra note 136. Note that an initiative to put Medicaid
Expansion on the 2020 ballot in Florida has been delayed and is now slated for the 2022 ballot.
See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
141

See Brantley & Rosenbaum, supra note 136.
Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Official Won’t Challenge Court on Initiatives, AP NEWS
(May 27, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-mississippi-health-courts-governmentand-politics-25cdf4e75c41fe64a91709592f39b9c6.
142

143
144

Id.
See Brantley & Rosenbaum, supra note 136.

145

Id.
Id. Other estimates state that an anticipated 1,748,000 individuals would be covered if the
state estimated expansion. See Louise Norris, Texas and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.healthinsurance.org/medicaid/texas/.
146

147

See Brantley & Rosenbaum, supra note 136; Karen Brooks Harper, Texas House Votes
Down Budget Amendment Aimed at Giving Health Coverage to More Uninsured Texans, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Apr. 22, 2021, 4:40 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/04/22/texas-housemedicaid-expansion-uninsured/.
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implement expansion, but it failed to pass.148 Texas has an upcoming governor’s
election, and the economic impact that Medicaid Expansion could have had if
previously been adopted and could have in the future has been a particular topic
of certain campaigns.149 Similarly, there are also upcoming gubernatorial races
in Georgia,150 Alabama, Florida, Kansas, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.151 While a change in leadership could
shift the balance of power in a certain state, this is not a given. Kansas has a
Democratic governor who has again included Medicaid Expansion in her
proposed budget for 2022, but efforts to expand Medicaid through legislation
were unsuccessful during the 2021 legislative session and a similar effort to
include it in the budget was likewise rejected for the 2002 fiscal year.152
According to one study, the probability of Medicaid Expansion becomes
increasingly difficult with greater Republican control. The study notes that
“between 2013 and 2020 every state with unified Democratic control. . .
expanded Medicaid when given the opportunity. In contrast, states with divided
control had a 35% chance of expanding, while Republican-controlled states had
an 8% chance.”153 While the authors concede that party-affiliation is not the
singular factor in Medicaid Expansion decisions, it does seem to contribute to
the obstacles. This seems to have played out in the 2021 legislative cycle. All
twelve of the non-expansion states in the year 2021 had Republican-controlled
legislatures154 and all states other than Kansas and North Carolina had a
Republican governor.155 Despite some comments by legislators and even some
bills that made it to a vote, none of the states adopted Medicaid Expansion during
the 2021 session.

148

Harper, supra note 147.
Nusaiba Mizan, Fact-Check: Did Texas Turn Down $100 Billion When Republicans
Rejected Medicaid Expansion?, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Jan. 9, 2022, 10:00 AM),
https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/politifact/2022/01/09/texas-turned-down-100billion-when-decided-not-expand-medicaid/8858664002/.
150
Sam Gringlas, Georgia Voters Will Decide the Next Governor and the State’s Status with
Medicaid, NPR (Jan. 24, 2022, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/24/1075264815/gavoters-will-decide-the-states-next-governor-and-whether-to-expand-medicaid.
149

151

Gubernatorial
Elections,
2022,
https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_elections,_2022 (last visited Mar. 8, 2022).

BALLOTPEDIA,

152

See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
Patrick N. O’Mahen & Laura A. Petersen, Will the American Rescue Plan Overcome
Opposition to Medicaid Expansion?, 36 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 3550, 3550 (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8356545/. The authors note that the obstacles are
not merely political, but ideological.
154
Election Results, 2021: Party Control of State Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2021:_Party_control_of_state_legislatures (last visited
Mar. 8, 2022).
153

155
Partisan
Composition
of
Governors,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Partisan_composition_of_governors (last visited Mar. 8, 2022).
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B. Impact of Medicaid Expansion
In addition to the incentives proposed in the ARPA, other organizations
have studied Medicaid Expansion to try and lay out the economic case for states’
leadership. For example, The Commonwealth Fund, published an Issue Brief in
May 2021 explaining the economic and employment effects of expansion based
on the ARPA.156 The Commonwealth Fund concluded the following:
Expanding Medicaid would increase federal revenue to the 14
states by $49 billion in 2022; state matching costs would be $5
billion. More than 1 million jobs would be created nationwide,
with largest gains in Texas (298,000), Florida (134,700), North
Carolina (83,000), and Georgia (64,300). Collectively, the 14
states would expand their economies by $350 billion from 2022
to 2025. While state governments would bear some additional
costs, the American Rescue Plan’s bonus incentives plus
additional tax revenues would exceed state matching costs.157
The proposed costs and savings are based on all states implementing
Medicaid Expansion as of January 1, 2022, which did not occur for any of the
twelve remaining states.158 The brief outlines what it refers to as the “Multiplier
Effect” to show the impact that Medicaid Expansion has on states through the
increased federal Medicaid revenues.159 Specifically, the report notes that federal
revenues to states for Medicaid Expansion passes through to providers (hospitals,
clinics, pharmacies, etc.), their staff, vendors (landlords, suppliers, etc.), and
retailers.160 All of those entities and individuals then pass along those revenues
to state and local municipalities through tax payments.161 Thus, the money paid
by the federal government for Medicaid Expansion does not support only the
beneficiaries who have the benefit of Medicaid coverage, but the economic
position of the state and its health system overall.
Research has shown that uncompensated care—care that hospitals
provide but for which they are unable to collect payment—is disproportionate in

156
Leighton Ku & Erin Brantley, The Economic and Employment Effects of Medicaid
Expansion Under the American Rescue Plan, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 20, 2021),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2021/may/economic-employmenteffects-medicaid-expansion-underarp#:~:text=The%20American%20Rescue%20Plan%20Act,family%20of%20three%20in%2020
21.
157
Id. It should be noted that the authors included Missouri and Oklahoma, which had not
implemented Medicaid Expansion at the time of publication. Both states have since implemented
Medicaid Expansion.
158
159
160
161

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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expansion states as compared to non-expansion states.162 Research published in
2021 compared hospitals in Louisiana to hospitals in non-expansion states.163
Louisiana is a good comparison to the other non-expansion states, as it resembles
in many respects those states in terms of its location, per-capita income, and preACA uninsured rate for its adult population.164 Overall, uncompensated care
accounts for only 3% of hospital operating expenses in expansion states and is
7% in non-expansion states.165 In comparing Louisiana hospitals before and after
expansion, Medicaid Expansion resulted in a “33% reduction in the share of total
operating expense attributable to uncompensated care costs for general medical
and surgical hospitals in Louisiana in the first three years after expansion.”166
The impact was especially pronounced in rural areas, finding that rural hospitals
noticed a 55% decrease in uncompensated care costs as a percentage of operating
expenses.167 This coincided with a drop in the state’s uninsured for non-elderly
adults, which was reduced from 18.3% to 11.8% by 2018.168 The hope is that
similar gains could be achieved in the remaining non-expansion states given the
similarities between Louisiana and many of the remaining non-expansion
states.169
Similarly, emergency access has been significantly reduced in nonexpansion states.170 Studies compared population access to all hospitals and
concluded that there was an increase in populations in non-expansion states
without emergency access to an acute care hospital as compared to states that
had expanded their Medicaid program.171 In quantifying their results, this
amounted to a projected population of 421,000 individuals and 48,000 lowerincome individuals who experienced a loss of emergency access in states that did
not expand Medicaid.172 This is compounded by a reduction in the number of

162

See Gideon Lukens, Medicaid Expansion Cuts Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs, CTR.
PRIORITIES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/medicaid-expansioncuts-hospitals-uncompensated-care-costs.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y
163
164

Id.
Id.

165

Id.
Kevin Callison, Brigham Walker, Charles Stocker, Jeral Self, et al., Medicaid Expansion
Reduced Uncompensated Care Costs at Louisiana Hospitals; May Be a Model for Other States,
40 HEALTH AFFS. no. 3, 1 (2021).
166

167
168

See Lukens, supra note 162.
See Callison, supra note 165.

169

See Lukens, supra note 162.
See David J. Wallace et al., Association Between State Medicaid Expansion and Emergency
Access to Acute Care Hospitals in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2772995.
170

171
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Id.
Id.
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safety net hospitals disproportionately located in non-expansion states.173 All of
this resulted in a “projected population impact of not expanding Medicaid [as] a
loss of emergency access to the nearest safety-net hospital for 2.2 million total
persons and 364,000 low-income persons for 2017 for states that did not expand
Medicaid.”174
As more time passes since the date upon which Medicaid Expansion was
first implemented by states, more and more evidence has emerged showing the
advantages of expansion for the individual residents of a state, for rural
communities in general, and for the financial viability of rural hospitals.
Although the business case for Medicaid Expansion appears clear, the adoption
of Medicaid Expansion has seemingly ground to a halt and it is not obvious
whether those incentives and motivating factors will be sufficient.
IV.

ARGUMENT

Jacy Warrell, Director of Rural Health Association of Tennessee,
recently stated: “I’m optimistic that rural communities have the potential to solve
this problem. I think what needs to happen is for policymakers and administrators
to really listen to the needs of the community and become partners in solving
these issues. I think the answers are there.”175 What are those answers and is there
reason to believe that policymakers and administrators are in fact listening to the
needs of rural communities? This is really the question that many are struggling
to solve, as the solutions for rural health access remain somewhat divided. The
health crisis that is currently taking place in rural America is happening across
the country and will require a thoughtful approach to reverse current trends.
Health disparities between our urban and rural communities have been widening,
creating a deepening divide that impacts outcomes and long-term health and
threatens the economic viability of rural communities. With both hope and
despair, it has become clear over the past seven to eight years that Medicaid and
the availability of Medicaid in rural communities can help stem the tide of
hospital closures and hospital financial instability. There is hope because
Medicaid Expansion under the ACA has given some states at least one additional
tool to curb hospital closures and bolster fiscal support for struggling hospitals.
Likewise, there is despair as it seems like some state leaders are reticent to use
the support that Medicaid Expansion could bring. This hesitancy could further
exacerbate regional disparities and make access even more challenging for
certain individuals in our communities.
Certainly, Medicaid Expansion cannot be thought of as the singular
savior or a quick-fix solution that will change the trajectory overnight. Rural

Id. (noting that the “majority of safety-net closures occurred in non-expansion states (37 of
73 closures [51%]), with an additional 11 closures occurring in later-expanding states prior to their
changes in Medicaid eligibility (cumulative of 48 of 73 closures [65%]).”).
173

174
175

Id.
See Sisk, supra note 20.
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hospitals are still struggling to stay afloat throughout the country, despite
Medicaid Expansion, due to changing dynamics of care delivery, staffing and
resources challenges exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic,176 and lack of
financial resources to upgrade and renovate ailing and aging facilities.177 It is
well-documented, however, that hospitals in expansion states have fared better
at staving off hospital closures.178 Thus, despite what might be considered an
uphill battle, it is vital that Medicaid Expansion or something in a similar form
that provides insurance coverage for uninsured and underinsured individuals in
rural communities continue to be pursued.
This begs the question: will current efforts to encourage or incentivize
states to adopt Medicaid Expansion be successful? If not, will current alternative
strategies be more successful, and will these alternatives be able to produce
similar gains? Based on the actions of the twelve non-expansion states, it seems
unlikely that the incentives proposed in the ARPA are likely to result in
widespread adoption of Medicaid Expansion for the remaining states. This is true
for three reasons. First, the ARPA was enacted in March 2021 and since that
date, there has been little momentum or response to the incentives offered under
the ARPA other than from advocates for Medicaid Expansion.179 The Texas
legislature did put a proposal for expansion up for a vote, which is more of a
reaction than has taken place in some other states.180 That said, it did not pass.
Other state legislatures have merely stated that they will “look into it” without
taking any meaningful action at this point.181
One state that may be the exception is South Dakota; there, the Secretary
of State in January 2022 validated a constitutional amendment that would

176

See Jessie Hellman, Rural Reckoning: COVID-19 Highlights Long-Standing Challenges
Facing Rural Hospitals. Will it Create Momentum for Change?, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 19,
2021), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/providers/rural-reckoning-covid-19-highlights-longstanding-challenges-facing-rural-hospitals-will; see also Sarah Kliff, Jessica Silver-Greenberg &
Nicholas Kulish, Closed Hospitals Leave Rural Patients ‘Stranded’ as Coronavirus Spreads, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/us/hospital-closures-west-virginiaohio.html (describing closures in West Virginia and Ohio, both states that expanded Medicaid, but
where rural communities are continuing to struggle).
177

See Sisk, supra note 20 (noting problems in Appalachia that impact Virginia, West Virginia,
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee, with only Tennessee and North Carolina being states
that have not adopted Medicaid Expansion).
178
See Lukens, supra note 162; Ku & Brantley, supra note 156; Wallace et al., supra note 170.
179

See Ku & Brantley, supra note 156; see also Hannah Katch, Anna Bailey & Judith Solomon,
American Rescue Plan Act Strengthens Medicaid, Better Equips States to Combat the Pandemic,
CTR.
ON
BUDGET
&
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(Mar.
22,
2021),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/american-rescue-plan-act-strengthens-medicaid-betterequips-states-to-combat-the.
180
See Norris, supra note 146.
See Kelman, supra note 117. The Tennessee legislature’s comments about “looking into it”
seem hollow based on the fact that the legislature has met for a special session three times since
the enactment of the ARPA to pass new bills but has never brought up or addressed in any way
Medicaid Expansion.
181
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approve Medicaid Expansion appearing on the November 2022 ballot.182 If it
passes, the bill will require South Dakota to implement Medicaid Expansion
effective as of July 1, 2023.183 There is also some movement to gather signatures
for a state statute to expand Medicaid that would appear on the 2022 ballot.184
Both of these efforts, however, are promoted by citizen action committees and
not through the legislature or the governor.185 The Governors of North Carolina
and Kansas have both attempted to include Medicaid Expansion in their state
budgets, but the legislatures have not yet acquiesced.186 For the remainder of
states, state leaders have mostly stayed silent or continued to tout their
opposition. Perhaps it is like a game of chicken with each of the states waiting
for the other states to act first. Regardless, despite initial hope that the incentives
would drive the remaining states to finally adopt expansion, the incentives do not
appear powerful enough at this point to convince state leadership to close the
coverage gap.
Second, most of the remaining states have a difficult path to expansion
based on an examination of historical processes. The biggest adoption of
Medicaid Expansion took place as of its ACA effective date—January 1, 2014.187
While there were a few states that implemented Medicaid Expansion relatively
easily after January 1, 2014, most of the remaining states adopted Medicaid
Expansion without support of either the governor, the legislature, or both in the
case of ballot initiatives.188 In the meantime, several states—primarily those
states that were openly opposed to Medicaid Expansion—created legal barriers
to expansion with the goal of ensuring that tactics adopted in other states were
not adopted in their state. For example, then-Tennessee governor Bill Haslam
had expressed support for Medicaid Expansion and engaged in discussions to
implement expansion through negotiation of a Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver.189
The legislature then passed a bill preventing the governor from being able to
expand the Medicaid population without express approval from the legislature,
thereby ensuring that the governor could not undertake Medicaid Expansion

182

See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.

183

Id. It is not clear whether the incentive funding would still be available at this point. Under
the ARPA, the funding is effective for a period of two years beginning July 1, 2021. It is possible
that these efforts will be despite additional incentives.
184
Id.
185
See Phil Galewitz, South Dakota Voters to Decide Medicaid Expansion, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2022), https://khn.org/news/article/south-dakota-medicaid-expansion-ballotinitiative/ (noting that Governor Kristi Noem “strongly opposes Medicaid expansion”).
186
See Medicaid Expansion Status, supra note 24.
187
188

See id.
See id.
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See Reid Wilson, After Months of Debate, Tennessee Medicaid Expansion Dies a Quick
Death,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
5,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/05/after-months-of-debatetennessee-medicaid-expansion-dies-a-quick-death/.
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without legislative support.190 As noted above, after the Supreme Court decisions
invalidating Mississippi’s balloting process, there are only a few states that even
have the capability to allow a decision on Medicaid Expansion to be made by the
voters. Nearly all the most recent expansions have been pursuant to a voter-led
ballot process and not through the governor or legislature. For the remaining 12
states, the path for expansion without major leadership change has been so
narrowed that expansion appears unlikely.
Lastly, there seems to be a level of entrenchment in current state
leadership that indicates that incentives alone will not be enough. As mentioned
throughout this Article, there have been numerous studies and research
conducted to establish both a business case and a health care case for why
Medicaid Expansion is not only beneficial for a state’s citizenry, but also for the
state itself. Although there is some upfront cost to establish the infrastructure and
an increase in overall expense due to the increase in the Medicaid population
more generally, the federal matching money that is invested back into the state
through its hospitals, providers, residents, businesses, etc. should offset this
expense relatively quickly. The savings and benefits of Medicaid Expansion to
financial health overall have been long touted and should be well-known to state
leadership at this juncture. Following the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of
California v. Texas, upholding the ACA for yet another time, total repeal of the
ACA, now over a decade old, appears less likely.191 Given all this, states do not
appear poised to react to incentives alone, as there have been inducements and
enticements to states for some time and the remaining states have long ago
forgone any such “carrots.”
In considering a solution, then, when incentives fail the most obvious
next step is some sort of deterrent or impediment, usually in the form of reduced
funding. For example, could states that refuse to expand Medicaid have their
federal matching for their standard Medicaid program reduced by the 10% the
federal government would have to pay to offer coverage to the expansion
population through the federal government? The likely reason that this approach
has not been used thus far is due to the holding of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”).192 Under NFIB, the Court held that
the federal government could not condition the federal matching for traditional
Medicaid on states’ expansion of their Medicaid programs to include low-income
adults who were not otherwise eligible.193 Thus, it was coercive to require states
to expand Medicaid; such expansion would have to be optional.194 This holding
becomes especially problematic for Congress and HHS in considering what types
of actions it might take to encourage adoption of expansion. Incentives are the

190

Id.

191

See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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Id. at 585–87.
Id. at 585.
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safest avenue because it is clear from the case that offering increased incentives
to states to expand is in no way coercive. If, however, the tactic is flipped and
penalties are imposed that act as a punishment to effectively hold back money
from one program to incentivize participation in the other program, this could
land Congress right back in the same position as NFIB. Thus, it becomes
increasingly difficult for Congress to fashion a way to encourage that states to
act without requiring them to do so.
The proposed plan in the Build Back Better Act is presumably designed
with this pitfall in mind; that is, the law bypasses non-expansion states altogether
and instead offers a federal option to those in the coverage gap, enabling them to
purchase insurance with no premiums.195 The drafters recognize the potential
flaw in this plan, however. There is a risk that if there is a federal option for those
individuals in the coverage gap, states that have expanded will lack any incentive
to continue to fund their 10% portion. Rather, states may drop their Medicaid
Expansion population and let those individuals purchase insurance on the
insurance marketplace covered at 100% by the federal government. To
ameliorate this risk, the current version of the bill provides an incentive to states
that have already expanded to maintain their expansion population by offering
them additional matching funds—an increase from 90% federal matching to 93%
matching.196 The funding is also only guaranteed for four years, which further
limits the time that a state could be assured that funding for individuals in the
coverage gap. This methodology is a result of the challenge that Congress faces
in trying to maintain Medicaid Expansion as originally contemplated under the
ACA while acknowledging the reality that closing the coverage gap will likely
require the federal government to step in.
Given these challenges, what might be the best approach to close the
coverage gap without sacrificing or cratering the success of the other states
operating Medicaid Expansion? The incentives proposed in the ARPA are a good
option considering the limitations set forth in NFIB, but the last few months have
proven that the political landscape and existing leadership make widespread
adoption unlikely, at least in the immediate future. Proposals like the Build Back
Better Act face the political realities more head on, but risk upending the
structure that seems to be working successfully by expanding existing Medicaid
programs in individual states. Further, any solution that contemplates offering a
federal option through commercial insurance purchased on the insurance
marketplace must be recognized as a different product altogether. Although
many states operate their Medicaid programs through third-party managed care
organizations, those managed care organizations are controlled by the federal
laws and regulations that dictate the way Medicaid is administered.197 In contrast,
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Build Back Better Act, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021).
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See id.
Elizabeth Hinton & Lina Stolyar, 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed Care,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-things-toknow-about-medicaid-managed-care/.
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the commercial insurers that offer insurance on the marketplace are subject to
the rules of qualified health plans on the health insurance exchange. These rules
do not contain the same controls and considerations that have been incorporated
in the Medicaid program because Medicaid is dealing uniquely with a lowincome population that likely cannot meet many of the cost sharing obligations
that might be common in standard insurance products. Thus, offering a federal
option through the insurance marketplace might help reduce the coverage gap by
providing insurance access, but it may not achieve the same successes and
benefits of Medicaid Expansion as originally envisioned.
Nevertheless, it is critical that Congress and HHS continue to push
efforts to ensure insurance access for the millions of individuals who are
currently in the coverage gap. It is clear based on the observations of many over
the last decade that ensuring some sort of payor coverage, whether it is Medicaid
or commercial insurance, can provide much needed financial support and
stability for rural health care providers. Bolstering rural health care providers and
safeguarding health care access not only improves health outcomes for
vulnerable rural populations but creates a positive economic impact for the
communities at large. Thus, despite the challenges of the ARPA incentives and
some of the drawbacks of proposals in the Build Back Better Act, continued
efforts to close the coverage gap need to continue. Although current incentives
do not seem poised to prompt the remaining twelve states to adopt Medicaid
Expansion soon, leadership changes could create a different result, or some states
may be able to successfully undertake voter-led initiatives. Incentives do appear
to be the safest way to avoid legal challenges that might arise with more
aggressive tactics, such as penalties or reductions to other aspects of federal
funding. While current efforts face many obstacles towards achieving the goals
of the ACA as envisioned, for places like Jellico, Tennessee, and rural Texas, it
is imperative for rural communities that these efforts continue.
V.

CONCLUSION

If current projections are correct, the recent hospital closures in Texas,
Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and other non-expansion states are likely to
continue on their current trajectory without interventions to reduce hospital
vulnerability.198 Studies and research over the last decade have made clear that
while Medicaid Expansion is not the singular solution, it does provide financial
support for rural hospitals and rural communities by association. The
Commonwealth Fund has noted:
States that expand Medicaid also realize economic benefits
beyond increased federal funds. For example, a Commonwealth
Fund-supported study found that as a result of new economic
activity associated with Medicaid Expansion in Michigan,
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including the creation of 30,000 new jobs mostly outside the
health sector, state tax revenues are projected to increase $148
million to $153 million a year from FY2019 to FY2021.199
By some estimates, the projected number of individuals who would be
able to enroll in Medicaid if all twelve of the remaining states adopted Medicaid
Expansion is 5,731,000.200 Thus, the potential impact of Medicaid Expansion on
the lives of millions of individuals and the communities in which they live is
substantial. It is for that reason that the continued efforts to realize the benefits
of Medicaid Expansion should continue, despite current challenges and
obstacles. Recent tactics such as increased financial incentives may not be
sufficient under current leadership, but it is critical for rural America that such
efforts continue. For individuals like Andrea Hass in Jellico, continuing these
efforts and trying to stave off more hospital closures can be a matter of life or
death. When asked whether she thinks that Jellico Medical Center will reopen,
she said, “I’m hopin’.”201
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